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CIA PRODUCTION OF ESTIMATES AND RELATED INTELLIGENCE 1946-1952  
(Tentative Research Outline)

I. Planning Stage to February 1946 (For background information)

SOURCES: Meetings of various bodies having to do with formation of a central intelligence agency; such notes as might be acquired from Montague, Lay, Souers and others having a direct part

II. The Interim Stage: The Reports Staff and Office of Research and Evaluation

A. Planning a coherent organization

B. Recruiting personnel

C. Getting out summaries of current intelligence

SOURCES: Meetings of supervisory bodies; NIA and IAB records; personnel records; files of early current intelligence publications; any records that may exist of transactions within ORE; personal files

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III. ORE Under the Intelligence Staff up to the First Reorganization

A. Nature of the Contest between the Staff and the Branches

B. Ambiguous position of Intelligence Staff

C. Acceptance of Situation Report Series

D. Recruitment problems

E. Production during this period

F. Decisions regarding new Organization

SOURCES: Records probably extant in various parts of R&R and elsewhere; personal records of some of those concerned; meetings of supervisory bodies; Central Records; personnel records; files of ORE publications

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IV. ORE from the First to the Second Reorganization To THE DULLES REPORT

- A. Nature and Effects of First Reorganization
- B. Operations under the Reorganization
- C. The "Bogota Crisis"
- D. Very gradual change of emphasis from Current to Estimate intelligence
- E. Added publications
- F. Problems of initiation---acceptance of questionable projects
- G. Problem of shaping final drafts
- H. Beginning and development of coordination difficulties: attempted remedies
- I. The time factor in producing estimates: attempted remedies
- J. Clashes within ORE
- K. Publications during this period
- L. Impact of the Dulles-Jackson Report

SOURCES: ORE records; Personal files; CIA organization charts; Central Records; internal ORE memoranda; AD and P&P records; correspondence between Staff Intelligence and Agencies; records of coordination meetings; For Bogota affair: newspapers, congressional hearings, and internal records; ORE publications files; Dulles Report plus any records showing reasons for findings; ICAPS records; NSC and DCI directives; relevant material in IAC Agencies if available; the Hoover Report; possible interviews

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V. From the DULLES Report to the Second Reorganization

A. ORE's deliberations over meaning of Report for ORE

B. The Rebuttal

C. Formulation of Reorganization Plans

D. The "Reitzel Committee" Report and other critical documents

E. NSC-50

F. ORE operations and publications during period

G. Growing conflicts in inter-agency coordination: adoption of sound recordings

H. Meeting of AD with agency colleagues to improve coordination: the impasse

I. Announcement of the "Reorganization": its nature

J. Opposition to reorganization plan; its adoption over opposition

SOURCES: ORE records; DCI and ICAPS records; IAC meetings; NSC records; Agency records if available; recordings of coordination meetings; ORE publication files; records of controversy over dissents; minutes and reports of various committees working with reorganization plans; files of Branch publications; files of miscellaneous publications and IM's

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VI. ORE under the Second Reorganization

- A. Lack of essential change in organization or operation
- B. Functioning of the combined "Publication Division"
- C. Attempts at closer working relations with Aencies
- D. Modifications in Daily and Weekly Summaries
- E. The "Stout Committee" report
- F. Continued prevalence of dissents
- G. CIA concern over intrusion of departmental policy into intelligence
- H. Apparent plans of DCI to control situation
- I. Publications of period
- J. The Korean Crisis: ORE's record with respect to this event

SOURCES: ORE,DCI, and similar records; memoranda on matter of departmental policy; publication files; internal records, newspapers , and congressional hearings having to do with Korea

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VII. The Third Reorganization

- A. Malfunctioning of ORE machinery under impact of Korean Crisis
- B. Resultant creation of AD's Special Staff
- C. Method of selection; composition, and theoretical functions of Staff
- D. Working out of Staff functions in practice
- E. Reason for Staff's relative failure to perform functions
- F. Achievements of Special Staff
- G. Gradual paralysis of Staff as New Order approached
- H. Effects of growing rumors on ORE in general
- I. Establishment of the New Administration

SOURCES: Principally ORE, CIA, and personal files; if possible, records of plans being made on higher levels of CIA and outside CIA for the forthcoming reorganization

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VIII. The New Order

- A. Gradual transition from old to new CIA
- B. Disappearance of ORE and assignment of its functions to OCI, R&R and ONE
- C. Nature and theory of ONE
- D. Period of adjustment in ONE: gradual emergence of definite organization
- E. Organization as crystallized after first year
- F. ONE methods of production and coordination
- G. ONE use of contacts outside CIA and IAC
- H. Achievements of ONE through 1951

SOURCES: ONE and CIA records; ONE publication files; IAC meetings

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